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VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES IN THE PRESENCE 
OF RISK: AN UPDATE AND DISCUSSION OF SOME 
EMPIRICAL ISSUES 
w. Douglass Shaw, Mary Riddel, and Paul M. Jakus 
ABSTRACT 
III 
The theory of ex -ante welfare measures is well establlished and has been addressed 
extensively in papers relating to the valuation of environmental resources when environmental 
variables have a random component. However, there have been many new developments in 
incorporating risks and uncertainty into economic models, and perhaps more importantly, 
there seems to be remaining confusion as to how to empirically implement such models. To 
date, a variety of estimation techniques have been utilized, with varying degrees of success in 
deriving an ex-ante welfare measure under risk. This manuscript assesses the state of the art 
by discussing the sources of risk, uncertainty, and error in utility models that incorporate risk. 
Weare most interested in how to incorporate these ideas into empirical models and we 
examine how econometric estimation methods can best be used to obtain ex-ante welfare 
measures. We also present the current thinking on endogenous versus exogenous risks as well 
as subjective versus "expert" risk measures, and discuss some of the advantages and 
disadvantages likely to be encountered when using subjective-based risk estimates in 
empirical applications based on alternatives to the expected utility models. 
VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES IN THE PRESENCE 
OF RISK: AN UPDATE AND DISCUSSION OF SOME 
EMPIRICAL ISSUES 
1. Introduction 
In this manuscript we examine the current literature on valuing environmental changes that 
involve risk or uncertainty. We are most interested in how econometric estimation methods can be 
used in models to obtain ex-ante welfare measures under conditions of risk, but understanding the 
underlying microeconomic theol)' is naturally essential to pursue empirical modeling so that is also 
addressed. Examples below relate to changes in the environment that can affect human and 
ecological health and well-being. 
Much of the risk-oriented economics literature is concerned with financial risk, where future 
income is uncertain and the focus is on trade offs between expected income and risk of investments. 
"Risk" typically measured by the variance of an asset portfolio (e.g. Hirschleifer; Pratt). While a 
great debt is owed to the authors of this literature, the work is perhaps only somewhat helpful in 
understanding how to model responses to environmental changes under risk. Another strand of 
economics literature focuses on human health and the risk of illness and death, but much of this 
literature is absent empirical values for risk changes and sometimes lacks a connection to the 
environment. It is nevertheless important, as it focuses on the theol)' relating to the value of a 
statistical life (VSL), and VSLs are regularly used in making environmental policy decisions (e.g. 
Berger et al.). Still another important strand of risk literature focuses on psychological models and 
risk perceptions (e.g. Slovic). Finally, there are several risk-oriented papers in the environmental 
1 This is naturally a highly selective review of the recent literature and we apologize to all those who have 
contributed important work in the area of modeling risk-taking behavior, especially as it relates to environmental 
changes. Our focus here is on papers that relate to empirical issues, bUl the reader interested ill theory can see 
Schoemaker or Starmer's survey papers. 
economics and valuation literature, but is little connection between all of the above-mentioned areas 
of risk research. This manuscript is intended to help bridge that gap. 
Many, if not all, current and serious environmental problems involve the risk of mortality, 
and to a lesser degree on morbidity. Problems also include the risk of impairment of ecological 
resources from exposure to contaminated air, water, food, or soils. Health and ecological effects 
from contaminants are rarely certain, though they were often treated that way in the environmental 
literature twenty years ago or more (e.g. Harrington and Portney's seminal work on air pollution and 
behavior). Even when health effects from exposure might be known, the exposure itself happens 
with some degree of risk. These risks can be quite small (Carson and Mitchell). Good examples of 
low probability exposure in the summer of 2002 was exposure to the West Nile virus in various 
places in the United States, and exposure to hoof and mouth disease in livestock in the United 
Kingdom in 1998. Arsenic in drinking water is another timely example of the connection between 
health risks and the environment in the United States. Siting or storage, and transportation of toxic 
and high-level radioactive nuclear waste is another good, current example (Kunreuther et al.). 
Much has changed regarding how economists think about risks and uncertainty as compared 
to original thinking on the subject. Older analyses assume that risks faced by an individual were 
exogenous to them, and easily measurable by experts in assessing risks. Lately however, some 
believe that nearly all such risks can be controlled by an individual or household through self-
protection, making the risks endogenous (Agee and Crocker 1994; Shogren 1990). Shogren and 
Crocker (1999) use the example of species extinction risk, pointing out that habitat is often 
controlled by individual and group economic decisions; they put it simply: "Risk is endogenous." 
(p. 44). As another example, morbidity and mortality risks associated with drinking water laden 
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with arsenic can be reduced through actions the household might take, including drinking bottled 
water, installing filters that are known to reduce arsenic concentrations to acceptable levels, or more 
drastically, even moving away from an area with high arsenic concentrations in the drinking water 
source. 
Subjective assessments of risk by the public were clearly different than objective or expert 
assessments in the West Nile and hoof and mouth cases mentioned above. Many individuals 
exhibited concern about going outside and being bitten by mosquitoes in the United States, and 
walking trails in the hills in areas around the United Kingdom were closed in response to hoof and 
mouth, likely helping to drive a wedge between the public's assessment of risks and those made by 
the experts. This suggests the possibility that behavior should be empirically modeled in a different 
manner than when we assume that risks are exogenous to the individual, and we address this below. 
The specific goals of the remainder of this paper are modest and fairly narrow in scope. We 
hope to describe current thinking on utility-theoretic models that incorporate risk, and describe 
appropriate welfare measures that might actually be estimated using data, all in the context of the 
environmental arena. First, we present some background on the conventional expected utility model 
and its application to environmental risk2. Second, we discuss alternatives to the EU framework, 
looking at the differences in results when an individual's subjective assessment of risk is used rather 
than SOlne exogenous determination of risk. Here we also consider the case of endogenous risk. 
Next, we consider stated and revealed preference approaches to actually empirically measuring 
values under risk, and [mally, we offer the reader a list of the challenges ahead. 
2 . The reader should note that imperfect information issues are sometimes thought to be synonymous with 
uncertainty, but in our view they are not, and this also is explained immediately below. Environmental concerns 
relate much more to uncertainty than poor or imperfect information in market or non-market settings. 
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2. Background and Literature 
We assume the reader is familiar with basics in risk and uncertainty, but at the outset, it is 
worth remembering that economists can deal best with well-defmed risks, expressed as 
probabilities, rather than with total unknowns. Often individuals do not have perfect information 
and while "imperfect information" relates to uncertainty, and valuation issues are not equivalent, 
even though one can derive the value of information (Antonovitz and Roe). In the world of 
imperfect information we assume that agents make decisions on the basis of the information they 
have at the time the decision is made (e.g. Foster and Just). They may, or may not feel uncertain 
about something when their decision is made, and in fact may be clueless that the information they 
use to make their decision is incorrect. As Foster and Just (and more recently Leggett) show, one 
can model the agents' actual decisions using the information they actually have, and then construct 
a welfare measure using both the poor information and the "correct" information that influences 
their actual well-being. As an example, if a person believes their well water meets drinking water 
standards, they drink it, but suffer the health consequences that depend on the actual well water 
quality. Their true willingness to pay to reduce the risk of those health consequences incorporates 
both the incorrect information and the correct information. We believe this consideration of the role 
of information to be rather different than our focus here, for under uncertainty society may never 
have "perfectly correct" information that can be used to update welfare measures. 
Though all uncertainty IS complicated in econOilllCS, health risks influenced by 
environmental conditions are something economists can cope with. The 1980' s produced several 
EPA-funded studies involving environmental risk that used some form of stated preferences to 
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derive welfare measures.3 Physical scientists at EPA were, and still are, interested in risk because of 
the association between this and environmental problems in the health and ecological risk 
assessment arena. Valuation of impacts for cost-benefit analysis gave way to the literature on option 
values, and the option price. In the next section we review the micro economic foundations for these 
welfare measures. 
2.1 The Expected Utility Model and Option Prices (Opt 
A large body of past literature explores issues connected to the option price (OP) and other 
ex -ante welfare measures, but the bulk of this literature addresses the microeconomic theory only 
and does not estimate or even offer a careful discussion of how to actually estimate ex -ante welfare 
measures using data; the discussion in these papers typically concludes well before one can glean 
the approach to estimating an equation that sheds light on a policy problem.5 Still, it is impossible 
to determine if an econometric model is consistent with the theory without carefully examining the 
theory first. 
2.1.1. The Expected Utility Model 
The derivation of the demand for goods and services in the presence of uncertainty owes 
virtually everything to the expected utility model (EUM) originally proposed by Bernoulli in 1738 
and advanced by von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1947. As an example, suppose there is a 
relationship between health (H) and enviromnental quality (q). Assume that the environmental 
quality level influences health ill a continuous fashion so that H = H(q) and 8H /8q > o. 
3 A few examples are Fisher et al. and Smith and Desvouges (1987). 
4 Those unfamiliar with the environmental valuation literature should be warned that though related, option prices 
here are not the same as pricing stock options. 
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Alternatively, if level qO is lower than level ql , then in a discrete approach an individual who is 
healthy (H) may tum to one deemed "sick" (S). This is of course where many certainty studies 
began. Those interested in uncertainty have also used a household production function for health, 
with arguments such as the state of pretreatment health in it (e.g. see Besley, who assumes the state 
can be measured so that it is a bad rather than a good). 
Let utility be a function of H(q), the consumption of other goods and services (z), and on 
non-stochastic income (Y). [We could let U depend on q and H separately, and also let H depend 
on q.6] Note that like most researchers we would probably make some simplifying assumption (e.g. 
separability) that allows us to ignore z so that data sets on consumption of every good do not have to 
be made available for empirical analysis. To develop a model with uncertainty, expected utility 
must depend on some probability distribution. Assume initially that environmental states, hence 
health risks, are exogenous: either estimable from some physical laws or at least supportable 
accurate data. The conventional EUM framework assumes both probabilities and outcomes, or the 
"prospects," are known and as the above notes, exogenous risks presume that the household cannot 
influence the level of risk they face. Utility when healthy is U H (Y,H(q)) , and when sick, 
Us (Y, H (q)), and the probability of each discrete state is Jr, and (1- Jr), respectively. Then 
expected utility is: 
(1) E[U] = JrU H(Y,H(q)) + (l-Jr)Us(Y,H(q)) . 
5 Innes and Cory provide a good example of a theoretical investigation, Larson and FIacco go further than this in 
suggesting general forms for expected demands, and Graham, in a lesser-known paper in 1983 also offers a few 
important suggestions for empirics. 




Assume that the expected utility function meets several conditions, including ordering, 
continuity, and independence. Continuity implies that any lottery can be represented by a certainty 
equivalent), and independence means that all outcomes are evaluated independently from other 
chances. One can maximize E[U] subject to the usual budget (Y) constraint, and derive optimality 
conditions. The resulting model of expected demands forms a basis for several theoretical welfare 
measures that have something to do with uncertainty. Of those, the most simple is perhaps the 
expected surplus, ES, which is the probability-weighted ex post consumers' surpluses. 
From (1), if one knows that the consumer's surplus when healthy is CSH , and when sick is 
CSs , then 
(2) ES = JrCS H + (1- Jr)CSs . 
Graham (1983) shows that if one writes the von Neumann utility function for i = 1 to n 
states, as: 
n 
(3) EU(x,Jr,[J,a,b) == LJri[aiu(xi;[J)+bi ] 
i=l 
then in fact, when the consumer is allowed to make choices after the state is revealed, estimation 
only allows recovery of the [J parameter in (3). This revelation of an uncertainty-type of 
experiment is consistent with recovery of ES, but does not allow recovery of the parameters a or b 
(see Graham's 1983 paper for discussion). 
The ES at first appears useful, but consider what ES represents when there is a program to 
improve drinking water quality. If an individual gets sick, which we assume happens with a 
probability equal to (1-n) =0.25, and we know that his surplus is $10, then of course (1-
n) CSs = $2.50. If CSH is equal to $15, then the ex post probability-weighted surplus is $13.75. 
When there are more than two outcomes with associated probabilities, we would simply add these 
in the determination of ES over all outcomes. The ES is thus a useful measure when one can learn 
the ex post levels of surplus, but this implies that the dice, as it were, have been thrown, and 
everyone can see them. This is not too likely. Consider two timely examples: the nuclear waste 
storage dilemma and climate change. Both involve risks well into the future, and probably a lack of 
knowledge about specific probabilities. Such a world is hardly consistent with resolution to 
uncertainty, and this is especially true in the nuclear waste case (see Kunreuther et aI., or more 
recently, Riddel, et ai. or Riddel and Shaw 2003, 2004), where risks of accidents must be assessed 
over a 10,000 year period of waste storage.7 A truly ex-ante measure of the welfare benefit of a 
program to address one of these issues is more critical for policy makers than an ex post measure. 
2.1.2 The Option Price 
The OP is such an ex ante welfare measure and it can be theoretically generated in the 
context of a conventional EUM. To review the OP, consider a policy that would increase 
environmental quality from qO to ql . The OP is: 
The OP is the payment made in advance of the resolution of uncertain conditions, such that 
the individual is indifferent between expected utility with better environmental quality less the 
payment, and expected utility with the original quality, without making the payment. The payment 
is equal in either state of health. As will be seen below, this definition is made very clear in Daniel 
Graham's (1981) framework, which assumes that contingent claims are made. There may exist a 
7 High-level radioactive wastes need 10,000 years to decay before mortality and morbidity risks from exposure fall 
to acceptable levels. 
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whole locus of pairs of possible contingent payments, but in equation (4) we assume one contingent 
payment (equal to OP) in both states described there. More generally, one could assume that H or q 
is a continuous random variable so that (4) requires integration over the continuous density function. 
The key to welfare analysis in the EUM is in Graham's willingness to pay (WTP) locus of 
ordered pairs because it allows comparison of several concepts, including each conditional surplus 
measure, the sum of these after weighting by probabilities (the ES), the OP, the certainty point, and 
fair bet point (the one locus pair with the largest expected value). His graphical exposition (see our 
Figure 1) is very helpful, and the paper was the fIrst clear presentation of the concepts, seminal in 
straightening out the issues. Key points about it follow. 
First, Graham's WTP locus is by assumption nonlinear, reflecting the assumption of 
financial risk aversion for the individual. Financial risk aversion is met when the second derivative 
of the utility function with respect to the risky variable, holding other things constant, is negative. 8 
In Graham's original exposition, the contingent payments were related to a farmer's desire to fund 
construction of a dam given a Bernoulli weather distribution, so that the payments on the axes 
corresponded to a dry and wet state, but we draw our Figure 1 for sick (S) and healthy (H) states. 
The 45-degree line shows all combinations of equal contingent payments, so the intersection of this 
line and the locus gives the OP. 
Using the EU framework Graham (1981) defInes option value (OV) as equal to OP less 
expected surplus (ES).9 On the graph in our Figure 1 as in Graham's (1981) fIgure, the OP happens 
8 As some still state that this means risk averse individuals decline all fair bets, it should be noted that Graham 
(1981) debunks this as a meaningful definition because even risk averse individuals would not necessarily decline 
purchase of fair insurance. 
9 Option value was a concept initiated by Weisbrod in 1964. All of these welfare measures are discussed briefly 
below, but more extensive discussion of the debate about the "sign and size" of option value (e.g. Cicchetti and 
Freeman; Graham 1981) can be found in Bishop or Smith ( 1992). 
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to exceed the ES. The ES is found by drawing a line parallel to the odds ratio through the point S 
(the conventional surplus pair), and identifying the point at which this new line would cross the 45° 
line. While in our case OV is positive, it needn't be. Though much time was spent on whether OV is 
positive or negative, Graham (1981) clearly shows that generally one cannot tell. He also shows that 
Cicchetti and Freeman's claim that OP generally exceeds ES is incorrect. In fact, if risk neutrality 
for Graham's weather gamble is assumed and there are no income effects, the Graham locus 
becomes linear, and ES and OP will be the same, unless some other way of relaxing these 
assumptions about risk references is introduced. We suspect that much of the focus in the 1980s on 
the OV was simply because many did not know how to ask the correct question to obtain an OP in a 
survey, or were not sure how to estimate an OP using the correctly obtained data. 
Solving equation (4) for the OP yields an equation that is empirically tractable given 
standard, simple deterministic forms for utility functions often used in economics. With a 
convenient expression available, one can examine how the OP changes with changes in health 




U H (Y, H(ql)) - Us(Y,S(qO )) 
J[ U HY + (1- J[) U sy 
where UHY for example, is the partial derivative of the state-dependent-healthy utility function with 
respect to income, and similarly, USy is this derivative when in the sick state. Economists naturally 
assume that UHY is positive. Of more interest is the sign and magnitude ofUSY, and at least allowing 
for the possibility that the marginal utility of a dollar is different than in the healthy state. At the 
extreme the two states are actually "alive" and "dead" and utility when dead is generally interpreted 
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in health models as some sort of bequest-related utility (Querner; Jones-Lee). Intuition suggests that 
an individual's value of an additional dollar will be less when sick (or dead!) than when healthy, but 
the degree of difference is an empirical issue. Consider a very simple utility function, one where 
utility is linear in Y, and H(q). Then equation (5) boils down to very simple differences in health 
produced via different levels of q, and respective constant marginal utility of income terms for each 
state. One could also examine dOP/dq, mapping through the health function as before, considering 
how changes in q change the health risks, and ultimately the OP. Intuition suggests that with higher 
health risks, an individual's ex ante payment for higher q will increase. 
The relationships between various measures are so far clear. If the expected utility function 
is concave in q, Jensen's inequality can be applied and it implies that the OP will be greater than 
the expected surplus, ES. Generally, one can graph the locus of pairs of contingent payments, fmd 
the point on the locus where the pair are equal (where Ps = PH = OP), compare these to expected 
surplus if this is of interest, and analyze differences between the concepts as Graham does (again 
see figure 1). This may be relevant because there may be cases where Graham's framework 
suggests that alternatives to the OP are adequate, as in his special case when risks are individual 
ones. \0 
2.1.3 Risk Aversion in the EUM 
Up to this point we have treated the way that risk enters the utility function very simply, 
akin to fmancial risk models that simply let investment income be the only risk variable that drives 
the individual's behavior under uncertainty. The focus on fmancial risk may obscure the fact that 
what we are really interested in is the environmental risk, or typically, the mortality risk associated 
11 
with an environmental problem. In fact there may be several potential sources of risk: either 
environmental quality, health status, or both, are random variables, and income could be also. With 
only one random variable, simple results are forthcoming in the EUM by examining the sign of the 
second derivative, as stated above. 
There is obviously a connection between financial risk and environmental values, as we 
have indicated above: the shape of the WTP locus detennines relationships between welfare 
measures for environmental changes under uncertainty, and that shape is determined by the 
implicit assumption of fmancial risk aversion (Pratt). It is tempting to assume, as many have, that 
if individuals are differing in their taste for financial risk, then more risk-averse individuals 
(averse in the sense of distaste for a mean-preserving spread of a lottery) will have a higher value 
for environmental protection, including the VSL. This may not be true. 
When more than one risky good is considered, it is no longer possible to look at one partial 
second derivative and determine overall risk preference. Assumptions about different forms of risk 
preference, for example financial versus environmental risk, may in fact also result in the 
equivalence of several welfare measure concepts (Lange, 2001).11 In fact, Eeckhoudt and 
Hammitt show that conventional treatInent of risk aversion is not enough to determine whether the 
value of preventing a bad risky outcome is higher for those who are risk averse than those who are 
not. 
In their insightful theoretical paper, Eeckhoudt and Hammitt cite many studies before theirs, 
such as Fuchs and Zeckhauser, who state that "the more risk averse a person is with respect to 
10 In his 1981 paper, Graham uses the example of various individuals who have desires to visit an outdoor park, but 
one may not desire it in one state, while another does, in exactly the same state. 
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wealth, the more he will pay to boost his probability of survival." (Fuchs and Zeckhauser, p. 266). 
Eeckhoudt and Hammitt define w to be wealth, Ua to be utililty when alive and lid to be utility when 
dead (usually bequest, or set to zero). Marginal utility of wealth in each state is denoted with ua ' and 
lid', respectively, and 11: is mortality risk. With these defmitions, in the conventional EUM, the VSL 
can be shown, using standard assumptions that survival is preferred to death and the individual is 
weakly risk averse to wealth to be: 
(6) VSL = dw EU = 0 ua(w)-ud(w) 
d:rr [1-:rr Jua' (w) + :rru/ (w) 
The VSL is therefore defined as the marginal rate of substitution between wealth and mortality 
risk, and equation (6) makes it clear that VSL is increasing in wealth, as long as the marginal 
utility of wealth when surviving is higher than when dead. Because so much environmental 
economics analysis in the 1980s and 1990s involved analysis of the VSL, we think that 
environmental economists came to believe that fmancial risk aversion was all that was important 
in analysis of impacts under uncertainty. Explicit in equation (6) is that U = U(w,1I: ).Mortality 
risk is obviously present as measured by 11:, but Eeckhoudt and Hammitt make assumptions about 
aversion to risk related to wealth that dictate curvature for the utility function. These assumptions 
about financial risk are not measured by 11:. Instead, they rely on the conventional Arrow-Pratt 
definition of risk, as indicated by the presence of a second derivative, with a negative sign. 
However, using these same definitions, Eeckhoudt and Hammitt readily show that the 
effect of financial risk aversion on an individual's maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to 
J J This seems to have been first noted by Pratt in 1964. Again note that when one omits any other source of 
randomness to characterize the risk other than income, then a linear in income utility function imposes risk 
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partially reduce mortality risk is ambiguous. Clearly, there are actually two sources of risk to 
consider, not one: wealth and the risk related to mortality. Eeckhoudt and Hammitt's framework 
would perhaps be clearer if there was a discussion regarding the probability distribution defining 
mortality risk and the separate probability distribution defining fmancial risk. Otherwise, one 
might assume that the only risky aspect to wealth pertains to one's inability to earn income when 
dead, and here the mortality risk would generate the distribution on wealth in their two states. 
However, they follow a large literature and are not "wrong" in any sense: as statistics enters into 
any analysis involving risk, we simply think it more elegant to include a clear discussion of the 
sources for random variables. 
When there is more than one source of risk the relationship between risk and WTP for 
reductions in risk depend on what other elements of the utility function are held constant while risk 
aversion in one dimension is increased. As a case in point, fmancial and environmental risks are not 
interchangeable: Eeckhoudt and Hammitt conclude that under many assumptions the relationship 
between financial risk aversion and the VSL that relates to mortality risk is ambiguous. Sitnilarly, it 
is easy to imagine that an individual may have some tolerance for environmental risks whereas they 
are strongly financially risk averse. Thus, a well-specified utility function should likely incorporate 
both the fmancial and environmental risk preference. 
In summary, most would agree that ex-ante welfare measures are the appropriate metric 
for analyzing costs or benefits when utility has a random component. The bulk of the literature 
does not offer a careful discussion of how to actually estimate ex-ante welfare measures. 
Deriving appropriate risk measures, and estimating the parameters of the expected utility model 
neutrality. 
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are empirical issues. The remainder of this paper focuses on issues related to estimating the 
parameters and values, such as the option price, of the expected utility model, and on what 
happens when risk assessments vary greatly across individuals l2 . 
3. Alternative Assumptions Regarding Uncertainty 
. The properties that EUM gambles are presumed to have are presented above and such a 
framework is restrictive. In particular, the independence axiom implies a set of linear, parallel and 
upward sloping indifference curves within the Machina-Marschak triangle. For those unfamiliar 
with this triangle, one may graph the preferences for gambles in probability space, analogous to 
graphing a set of indifference curves in two-dimensional quantity space. The resulting iso-utility 
curves are over the relative risks. The triangle is based on the assumption that there are three 
gambles. Naturally the probability of any third one, say prob2 is recovered from 1 - prob3 - probl . 
Conventionally, expected utility is of course linear in probabilities [aE[u(X)]/ aJri = u(xi )] , which 
is a constant. The slope of the iso-utility curves is given by dprob3 / dprob], and so this is a positive 
constant as well. 
The individual chooses the gambles taken by picking bundles under uncertainty. 
Independence requires that for all prospects, s, r, and t: if s is weakly preferred to r then (s, p; t, 1-
p) is weakly preferred to (r, p; t, I-p) for all p. Quemer puts this nicely: if one prize from a lottery is 
preferred to another prize, two lotteries only differing in these prizes should be ranked the same way 
as the prizes at hand. Complementary or substitution effects between different outcomes are ruled 
out. The usual predictions of the standard EUM (see Schoemaker) include that the: 
1. estimated ex ante welfare (OP) should be sensitive to the magnitude of the risk change 
12 A reviewer notes that this might be a case for allowance of individual heterogeneity. 
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2. OP should be roughly proportional to the change in risk 
3. baseline level of risk should NOT influence OP in evaluating equal changes in risk (i.e. 
the ex ante willingness to pay to reduce risk by 1 percent when there are large risks 
should not be different than when there are small risks) 
4. rate of substitution between risky choice A and another risky choice B remains constant 
throughout the range of risks that are faced. 
These are strong predictions. Those who are critical of EUM claim that the independence 
axiom is unfounded, pointing to the sea of experimental and other evidence that contradicts the 
EUM's predictions. Some suggest that these violations of the independence axiom are 
particularly relevant to low probability events that would have devastating consequences if they 
happened. Mortality risks related to nuclear wastes, or earthquakes may fall into this category. 
Several authors continue to use the EUM coupled with exogenous probabilities (e.g. Cicchetti 
and Dubin), but as some authors have said, "the major lesson of recent research of individual 
behavior under risk is that it is not always consistent with the expected utility approach; in short, 
there is no generic model for evaluating behavior under risk" (Buschena and Zilberman). 
By 1953, Allais had already demonstrated several contradictions flowing from the EUM's 
predictions for choices; others have recently categorized failures similar to the ones he outlines as 
common consequence or ratio effects (see Allias 1953, 1979; Starmer). Early simple experiments 
demonstrated that when choosing gambles, individuals often exhibited behavior inconsistent with an 
ability to rank gambles. Let an individual have to choose between a1 or a2, and between a3 and a4, 
where l3 : 
13 We take this representation of Allais ' s paradox from Mason et al. ' s paper. 
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AI: $1 million with probability = 1.0 
A2: $5 million with prob. = 0.1, $1 million with prob. = 0.89, $0 with probability = 0.01. 
A3: $5 million with prob. = 0.10, $0 with probability 0.90 
A4: $1 million with prob. = 0.11, and $0 with prob. = 0.89 
The lines connecting al to a2, and a3 to a4 are parallel, so if the individual's indifference curves are 
straight lines, as the EUM suggests, then he prefers al to a2 and a3 to a4, or a2 to al and a4 to a3. 
However, laboratory experiments shown subjects choose al and a3, and thus, the indifference 
curves cannot be straight lines. Observed choices led researchers to the conclusion that preferences 
were often reversed, that unequal gambles sometimes were treated as equal ones, or that individuals 
did not behave rationally. 
Ex ante efficient choice may fail for a variety of reasons that are mostly in the realm of 
discrepancies between agent's assessments of the probabilities that describe the risks (Besley) and 
assessments by experts. The experimental economics literature, very much in vogue today (see 
Mason et al. for an example), has carefully examined issues of demand under uncertainty and the 
evidence generally supports the notion that people tend to overvalue reducing the probability of low 
risk events and undervalue risk reduction of high-risk events relative to the predictions of the EUM. 
Mason et al. fmd that indifference curves over lotteries are often concave rather than linear in 
probabilities. Despite evidence like this traditional EUM supporters are hesitant to support 
alternative theories that could potentially lead to non-unique choice sets. In response to these critics, 
many of the new theories of demand under uncertainty examine how nonlinear indifference curves 
over risky bundles or prospects might be incorporated while still ensuring unique demand 
relationships (Loomes and Sugden; Besley). 
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In his survey article Stanner lumps many alternatives to the EUM together because they 
seek relaxation of this independence axiom. As an example, Machina (1982) introduced a 
generalized expected utility model (GEUM) to allow the expected utility indifference curves to fan 
out, recognizing that concavity of the probability derivatives are allowable even with non-expected 
utility preference functions. This generalized model relaxes the constant slope (i.e. the rate at which 
the prospects are traded for one another), as one moves from very low to very high risks, and this is 
fairly appealing. Machina's GEUM hypothesizes monotonicity (if one prospect fIrst-order 
stochastically dominates another, the dominating prospect is preferred), and fanning-out, and some 
do not wish to see a requirement for fanning-out. Consider two pairs of prospects (R', S ') and 
(R",S"). If preferences for the two pairs violate the EUM , than fanning-out implies that the 
violation is of the fonn such that the person is more risk -averse when evaluating the stochastically 
dominating prospects than when evaluating the dominated ones (Stanner and Sugden). 
Yaari and several others have weighed in on the failures of the EUM (see Stanner) , 
proposing variations on the standard EUM that may help in resolving paradoxes that arise in the 
EUM context. 14 Eeckhoudt and Hammitt state that Yaari's dual non-expected utility theory is a 
special case of rank-dependent EU theory and cumulative prospect theory. In Yaari's model one 
simply uses linear utility functions in wealth (w) and a probability weighting function here), so that 
U = [l-h(re)]w + h(re)~w. Here the fIrst tenn is the utility of wealth while alive and the second tenn 
the utility of wealth when dead. The weighting function has the properties that h(O) = 0, h(1) = 1, 
and dh/d re > 0. 
14 Yaari's "dual theory" of choice under risk explains some of the Allais paradoxes. 
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Several other alternatives (again see Starmer's excellent discussion) also relax the 
independence axiom, allowing the model to depend on the description of the probability 
distributions for the consequences. Perhaps the most well-known alternatives today are prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky or Tversky and Kahneman 1981) and the prospective reference 
theory (PRT) of Viscusi (1989,1990). 
Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory defmes consequences as gains or losses relative to 
a reference point, which in their models relates to a level of wealth. In this sense a gamble can be 
treated quite differently if it involves a loss, or negative consequence, as opposed to a gain, or 
positive consequence. Strictly positive or negative consequences involve quite a different 
formulation of the utility maximization problem than conventional EUM: expected value is 
decomposed into a certain gain and a probabilistic one, or in the case of a negative consequence, a 
certain loss and a probabilistic one (see Starmer and Sugden). 
Viscusi's PRT is similar to prospect theory. In it, Viscusi replaces 1t in each of the above 
expressions with a function of 1t, say II(Prob). Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 
essentially would essentially do this also. For example, let the function be linear in the reference risk 
levels: 
(10) II (Prob) (y Prob+ a PJ = ------------~ (y+a) 
Here the Po is the probability of the expert's assessment of the original outcome and 
Prob is the individual's prior assessment of risk. The y and a. are the weights assigned to the 
informational content in each (the expert's and the person's own prior assessment of the risks.) If 
updating reduces the weight given to the prior, then the probability approximates the expert 
assessment. Starmer categorizes PR T as being a theory which helps explain "event splitting" 
effects. Here, a risky exposure might be described as producing several sub-risks, each with a 
smaller probability perhaps than one larger probability risk. When defmed with the many sub-
risks, the consequence then gets more weight than otherwise. 
Starmer deems some alternatives to the EUM as being unconventional in that they focus on 
how and why individuals make decisions; these include the view that the agent is boundedly 
rational. In one of the more interesting experiments we found, Starmer and Sugden (1989) tested 
various alternative theories, including the GEUM, Prospect Theory, and Quiggin's rank-dependent 
theory. The authors describe their own work as a pilot study, but they do not fmd any particular 
pattern in violations of the EUM, though most of their results indeed do suggest violations of the 
conventional theory. They were looking to see whether the statistics supported consistent fanning-
out of indifference curves over gambles, or consistent fanning-in, but they fmd support for either 
one being true in their data. Still, their pilot study may lend credence to incorporation of subjective 
risk assessments, discussed next. 
3.1 Subjective Risk Assessment and Perceptions 
Both prospect, and rank-dependent theory belong to the set of subjective expected utility 
theories (Starmer and Sugden). Economists may certainly argue about how to use subjective risk 
assessments, or what to do about these if they greatly differ from objective assessments, but perhaps 
irrefutable is that laypersons just do not always evaluate risks in the same way that experts do. 
Besley's example is the insurance agency's expert and the insured party. If people believe 
something different than what accumulated statistics or laws of science suggest about risk, then they 
will likely behave in ways based on their beliefs, not the statistics. Further, in some cases, they can 
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make "bad" choices based on their beliefs. David Ropeik, director of risk communication at 
Harvard's Center for Risk Analysis cites the example of a mother of United Airlines attendant who 
drove on a trip rather than flew shortly after 9111 and was killed in a car crash. He says she was "too 
afraid of low risk [flying] and . . . her risk perception led her to a choice that was dangerous." 
(Dreifus). An individual's risk perceptions have been empirically shown in many cases to be quite 
distinct from other agent's technical assessment of risk (see Schoemaker for a summary). 
Let the individual's risk perceptions be subjective probabilities, deemed prob. These might 
be used in lieu of, or at least to complement expertly assessed risks. 15 It may be that the probability 
of an outcome (z) based on expert judgement [n (z)] and the perceived probability of an outcome for 
the individual, prob(z), are roughly equal, and one might initially assume that the individual's 
assessment of risk can be treated as an exogenous and objectively determined variable. We could 
then simply modify the EUM by substituting these perceptions for actual risks into the usual 
equation for the EUM, as was suggested by several psychologists in the 1950's. 
Very large divergences between expert and individual probabilities can be troubling. They 
may arise for several reasons. For example, Riddel et al. and Riddel and Shaw 2003 fmd consider 
the Department of Energy's (DOE) assessment of the risk of mortality from an accident during 
planned shipping of nuclear wastes, and assessments by Nevada residents who live near the 
proposed shipping routes and the fmal storage site of Yucca Mountain, Nevada. DOE's assessment 
of mortality risk from a transportation accident is about 2 in 10 million, about the same as dying 
15 The work of psychologists such as Paul Slovic (1987) suggests that in many instances "actual" risks are simply the 
assessment of risks according to another group of people, often deemed experts. 
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from ingesting weed killer. 16 On average, individuals in the estimating sample greatly over-estimate 
this tiny risk of DOE's: prob(z) is thousands of times higher than DOE's estimate. Respondents do 
this even when presented with an information brochure depicting a risk ladder with DOE's 
estimates, because of a lack of understanding of the problem, failure to comprehend these very 
small probabilities, a lack of knowledge, or information. If public policy requires action affecting 
individuals who will bear the risk, such as the nuclear waste transportation scenario, then a massive 
policy failure will occur unless the average household's perceptions are moved much closer to the 
agency assessment. As an aside, failures in the risk communication process (Smith and Desvousges; 
Riddel and Shaw 2003) leave a program in dire straights with respect to public support, as may be 
true for the DOE nuclear waste program in the future (Flynn and Slovic 1995). 
Of course there may also be failures in the experts' original assessment, mitigating factors, 
strong preferences, and special characteristics of the risk-bearing households that complicate the 
risk communication process. Education or learning has the potential to move the individual's 
probabilities closer to n(z), but this shift cannot be guaranteed. In fact, the experiments in risk 
communication in the 1980s suggest that educating the public about risk is quite hard to do. A 
timely example is the recent example of the Center for Disease Control trying to educate the public 
regarding the real probability of dying from exposure to anthrax powder in an envelope. The CDC 
itself seemed unsure of the probability of morbidity or death with the type of anthrax being 
distributed in the mail. 
16 DOE obtained these estimates using statistics on accidents, and engineering tests, such as ramming aircraft engines 
into storage and shipping casks to see if they will break and leak 
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So, if individual subjective probabilities remain important, a key issue concerns the manner 
in which these are introduced in any model. We consider three approaches here, using stated 
probabilities to replace the objective ones, using estimated probabilities, and using decision weights. 
3.2 Using Stated Probabilities in a Risk Model 
All of the above suggests that perhaps we should simply ask individuals to state what 
they think the probability of an outcome is. This approach was used by Crocker and Shogren 
(1991), and in a more advanced fashion, by Cameron (2003b). Here the modeler assumes that the 
stated probability is fixed, as a household's reported income is, and uses the variable 
accordingly. The attractiveness of this approach is that individuals can reveal heterogeneity in 
their expression of understanding and feeling about the mortality or morbidity risk related to an 
environmental change. 
While appealing in its simplicity, this approach could pose problems. First, individuals 
may be poorly informed and change their beliefs substantially when new information is 
conveyed to them, strongly suggestive of treatment of the stated probability as a random 
variable, or the need for Bayesian updating. Second, one worries that if surveys are used to 
recover ex ante welfare measures, then each individual has a different understanding of the 
"good" being valued, because each assessment of risk accompanying the environmental change 
may vary. To offset some of the concerns, "alternative" theorists have proposed the use of 
decision weights. 
Decision Weights 
Decision weights are again consistent with subjective expected utility theory. Using them is 
a way to reconcile the difference between subjective and objective risk assessments, by introducing 
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probability weighting functions: V(s) = If(w;)(probi ) , where again, s is a prospect, and here 
f (Wi) is the weighting function. A weighting function can help explain observed behavior that 
contradicts what would be predicted under the EUM. The exact fonn that the weighting function 
takes is critical to our arguments below. 
Quiggin (1991) summarizes the thinking on weighting functions. If the weighting function is 
linear and defmed to map in the unit interval, he suggests that a correct weighting function simply 
forces the alternative model to become equivalent to the EUM. It is the nonlinear weighting 
functions that are more appealing on one hand, such as the s-shaped curves underlying much of the 
work to address discrepancies in losses and gains, but these nonlinear functions also create serious 
problems for the person who might be interested in welfare measures. 
Fishburn noted that in many simple forms this type of weighting scheme leads to the 
expected utility function Yes) having the property of violating monotonicity of preferences. Such 
a violation would clearly spell trouble for welfare estimation, as the meaning of the welfare 
measure would be so different from any conventional notion. Subsequent schemes such as rank-
dependent expected utility theory (RDEU - Quiggin 1982) can ensure that Yes) is monotonic. 
Quiggin (1991) appears to view RDEU essentially as expected utility, but for a transfonned 
probability distribution. The key difference between his notion of the RDEU and other weighting 
schemes is that the weights take into accord the entire probability distribution rather than only 
one individual probability (PD. Fonnally, the RDEU defines a weight as hi(PROB), where 
PROB represents a vector of probabilities, while typical weighting schemes defme a weight as 
wi(pD· 
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Finally, Quiggin and Chambers derive properties of generalized expected utility models 
concerning risk aversion. They demonstrate that while a preference function in the context of the 
EUM can display constant absolute risk aversion, or constant relative risk aversion (CARA or 
CRRA, respectively), it cannot display both, except in the trivial case of risk neutrality. Some of 
the generalized models however, can in fact display both properties. This is important in valuing 
environmental changes because individuals have choices to make regarding the functional form 
and the role that income, or another key variable plays in introducing various preferences for 
risk. We return to the empirical issues when using stated probabilities in Section 5, below. 
4. Empirical Approaches: Stated and Revealed Preference 
4.1 Stated Preference Models 
Most studies that actually fmd empirical values for environmental changes under risk use at 
least some stated preference (SP) data: here we basically mean the modelers asked valuation 
questions directly, using some sort of survey format, and typically applied the well-known 
contingent valuation non-market valuation (CVM) approach. To get risk-related welfare measures 
the survey questionnaire has to describe uncertainty carefully, so that the respondent understands 
that environmental changes that occur with a meaningful probability, greater than or equal to zero 
and less than or equal to one. If the survey question is posed about the future, but with no degree of 
uncertainty introduced, then the resulting welfare measure may have a connection to the future, but 
might simply be an existence, bequest, or preservation value, none of which necessarily involve risk 
or uncertainty. 
The manner in which the all-important probabilities are communicated to respondents in 
these surveys became a critical issue in the 1980's work (e.g. , see Smith and Desvouges 1988), and 
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some researchers are still quite pessimistic about the way individuals can incorporate probabilities 
into their understanding of risks, especially when valuation is the goal (see Hammit and Graham). 
However, many environmental economists have come to favor the risk ladder approach to 
communication (see Carson and Mitchell; Loomis and Duvair; Riddel, et al. for an application). 
Good risk communication is important in any empirical SP model. Upon close inspection of 
many existing empirical SP studies it is difficult to know if the claims of estimating a particular ex 
ante welfare measure are valid: it is hard to tell whether what was estimated was really an OP (e.g. 
Brookshire, Eubanks, and Randall), or something else. This is partly because published papers do 
not often include the text of the survey questionnaire, but also because the source of the randomness 
and exactly how it is connected to risk or uncertainty, how it relates to underlying preferences, and 
the actual empirical model estimated, are not cOlnpletely clear to the reader. 17 
4.2 Revealed Preference 
Though stated preference models have been widely used to develop ex -ante welfare 
measures, we are aware of very few environmental economics studies that have used revealed 
preference (RP) data to obtain such measures for changes in non-market goods. IS Thinking about 
the issues involved in using RP data carefully, one can see why this is true: behaviors must have 
occurred that can shed light on risk-taking, and these behaviors and the associated risk levels (the 
probabilities) must somehow be uncovered for modeling purposes. To obtain RP data and derive 
17 Examples are Edwards (1988), Brookshire et aI., and Loomis and Du Yair. We note that Loomis and Du Yair do 
not seem to let their empirical model depend on the probabilities relating to the risky outcomes, but they are careful 
to mention that their empirical model is ad hoc, and that their approach assumes everyone is risk neutral. Jakus, 
Riddel and Shaw discuss some of the difficulties in using RP data in a risk context. 
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welfare measures, rather than ask directly for stated values that translate to an OP or some ex-ante 
welfare measure, one must obtain actual behavior with an implied ex ante payment in two or more 
uncertain states. The trick is in establishing clear, expressible utility differences so that an ex-ante 
welfare measure may be derived. 
Akerman et al. make what they claim is the very first attempt to use RP data to recover 
environmentally-related values under uncertainty, using mitigation costs to reduce the risk of getting 
cancer from radon exposure in one's home. Their experiment is ideal because they can observe 
behavior in response to risk. Unfortunately, they admit that their cost data are not quite up to 
standards, and a lack of detail in the published paper makes it hard to discern just how the risks were 
fully incorporated: it may just not be clearly explained, but the probabilities underlying getting 
cancer are absent in the econometric modeling described in their paper. 
Some other environmentally-related studies examine the role of imperfect information do 
use RP data. In Agee and Crocker's study an observed behavior is whether the child was chelated to 
reduce the risks from exposure to lead. Dickie and Gerking examine behaviors in response to skin 
cancer risk. These observed behaviors play the same role as the observed keeping of potentially 
contaminated fish by anglers in Jakus and Shaw's study. Still, links between actual observed 
behaviors and perceived risks, as well as to objective risk measures are difficult to uncover. 
Incorporating the relevant probabilities into a pure RP model will indeed continue to be a challenge, 
especially if one wishes to incorporate ambiguity effects. In other arenas, economists have used 
18 Akerman et al. use data on remedies to household radon problems and this may be the first RP-risk study, Agee 
and Crocker (1994) use RP data to explore the effect of information on perceived risk, and Jakus and Shaw (2003) is 
another recent exception. In their theoretical paper Larson and FIacco suggested that revealed preference (RP) 
models can be used to estimate ex-ante welfare measures under risk, but their discussion does not focus on issues in 
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market data to examme ambiguity effects (e.g. Ho et al.), but this has not been done to our 
knowledge in environmental analysis. 
Jakus and Shaw's (2003) recent work scratches the surface in that fishing behavior and 
estimated probabilities based on observed behavior are used to recover a risk-related welfare 
measure, but their survey was not specifically designed to reveal an ex ante measure of welfare: 
the authors make no claim that they have estimated Graham's option price. Other RP modelers 
are a bit vague about what the welfare measure actually is (an OP, OY, or an ES),19 so there may 
be interesting work ahead on the nature of the welfare measure in these models. 
4.3 Empirical Models and Sources of Randomness 
Whether SP or RP, empirical models typically add an error (£) to detenninistic terms make 
them random variables. This error is assumed associated with the investigator's failure to recognize 
all variables that may influence an individual's utility. It does not originate in the individual's 
uncertainty about some event. In contrast, much of the empirical literature that deals with the 
individual's uncertainty does not consider measurement error, or incorporating the usual 
investigator's errors. As a preview to below, we might need to carefully consider the derivation of 
the ex ante welfare measure when measurement error is also present; a rich model might allow two 
random variables to enter into the derivation, one to represent measurement error and the other to 
incorporate the uncertainty. 
Estimation is typically accomplished by assuming a mean zero errors, and the independent 
variables in the lTIodel are assUlTIed non-stochastic whereas the dependent variable is stochastic. 
More formally, the usual sources of error are (i) omitted variables, (ii) error in measuring the 
actual empirical implementation. 
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dependent variable, and (iii) measurement error in the independent variables. All but the last are 
consistent with the Gauss-Markov assumptions of classical modeling, assuming that the omitted 
variables or measurement error are not correlated with the independent variables. The last source of 
error violates the classical assumptions. Using simple linear and semi-log demand functions and 
assuming no uncertainty on the part of the individual, Bockstael and Strand (1987) nicely 
illustrate that assumptions (i) to (iii) will yield different computed welfare measures. They 
illustrate that the assumed source of randomness makes a difference when computing certain 
welfare measures. Their argument is basically as follows. 
Suppose CS is generally denoted as f(x), and E[CS] = E[f(x)] denotes the expected value 
of CS when there are random variables. The potential problem is seen by again applying Jensen's 
inequality, when f(x) is a convex function: 
(7) f[E(x)] ~ E[f[x]] 
The inequality sign in (6) is reversed when f(x) is a concave function. The above implies here that a 
more general expected consumer's surplus will be equal to, or greater than, the surplus generated 
from expected demands. Bockstael and Strand conclude that for any consumer's surplus function 
that is convex in x (the demands), there will be a difference in consumer's surplus depending on the 
implicit assumption about the source of error. 
We extend this discussion to allow for risk and uncertainty. Intuitively, if Bockstael and 
Strand obtain the result in models with no uncertainty, we might well expect that different 
assumptions about random variables in models with uncertainty also lead to different welfare 
19 For example, Agee and Crocker simply deem their welfare measure a marginal willingness to pay. 
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measures. Using some of Larson and Fiacco's suggestions, Kling demonstrates this using some 
simulations and literature estimates of option value. 
As a specific example of what might be involved let q be the arsenic level in water drunk at 
the tap, a function of a naturally generated concentration of arsenic found in bedrock or soils 11, but 
randomly distributed because of weather and precipitation patterns that affect the flow in ground or 
surface water. It may also be a random variable because of random patterns of exposure from 
drinking from a particular source, but the basic idea is that q = 17 + u. The suggestion here is that a 
systemic portion of q helps explain the variation in arsenic concentrations in drinking water across 
different geological regions, but so does a random component, D. In this case a simple conditional 
indirect utility function V(y, p, q) is (a choice implies a nonzero price, p so that this p is subtracted 
from income, y) rewritten: 
(8) V =a+j3(y -p)+Y(17+v)+£ 
Given this fonnulation, we perhaps ought to consider potential correlation between the 
random variables, say between the two sources of randomness, vand &, when developing a model 
that incorporates risk and measurement error. In the arsenic example we give above, vand & are 
somewhat likely to be correlated, depending on whether the variations in the weather lead to both 
shocks in the measured arsenic level, and also the demand for water at the tap. Perhaps extreme 
temperatures would affect both. Again, the assumption about the source of & will be important, as 
will as the nature of the randomness underlying v. We know of no others that have considered the 
possibility of this process underlying q or q, so there is no discussion in the literature of potential 
non-zero covariance tenns that might arise. 
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Another approach one could take is to let estimates of health risks themselves be measured 
with error, and deem that error "uncertainty.,,20 Let health (H) be a random variable, so that: 
(9) H =H*+~ 
Where H * might in turn be a deterministic function, for example, H* = a + q + bD , where q is 
again environmental quality but here it is not playing the direct role of a random variable, and D 
represents health-related expenditures. As in the first part of this paper, a standard assumption is that 
aH > 0, i.e. that this type of spending improves health, perhaps through preventative medicines 
aD 
and procedures. 
To our knowledge no one has implemented the ideas above, but we suggest that they can 
be. Below we give some cases involving uncertainty and offer examples of how to implement 
some of the more novel ideas empirically, largely ignoring the case where probabilities are 
exogenous and simply determined. 
5. The Challenges Ahead: Considering Specific Cases 
Here we consider specific cases involving the data, situation, and modeling, and layout the 
challenges that lay ahead for empirical modelers. 
[Case A] Suppose that q is random and discretely distributed. Further, suppose that q is 
measured with an indicator variable, with q = 1 a "poor quality" situation, and q = 0 the status quo, 
with good quality. Examples are when a leak from a gasoline or oil storage tank occurs or does not, 
20 Lichtenberg et al. say that a health risk means the probability that an individual selected randomly from the 
population contracts an adverse health effect. Health risk estimates are subject to error because the relationship 
between that risk and the variables that generate it cannot not be known with certainty. The term "uncertainty" is 
used as the measure of the magnitude of that error. 
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or when nuclear waste is transported or not, meaning that accidents in transportation happen, or do 
not. Both events involve probabilities, and the next step is to determine what these are. 
In a very simple model, we might assume that q follows a Bernoulli process. For example, 
when q is a nuclear waste accident, if it is not transported, then the probability of q = 0 is zero. 
However, with transport, a nonzero n must be determined. In the expectation over q for a simple 
indirect utility function we have a simple model where Eq[ ql - qo] = E[ ql] = n. If this probability is 
exogenously given it may be the same for all individuals. We expect that this risk level, if it had any 
significant effect at all, would negatively influence a decision involving these risks. To empirically 
implement this model, one likely needs a discrete choice behavioral model because q implies this. 
One could, for example, write the conditional indirect utility functions, take expectations over q, 
resulting in forms that can be estimated. 
Modifying equation (7) after taking expectations, one hopes to see an indirect utility 
function of the form V(p, Y, q, n) so that the change in utility with respect to the risk can be 
evaluated. If estimated using the logit or probit discrete choice models, then the estimation also 
involves the usual investigator errors. If we see a conventional logit or probit model with no risk 
measure in the utility function, we do not believe that the model can be correctly incorporating 
uncertainty. If expectations of utility with respect to the random variable are properly taken, the OP 
ex ante measure can be found by examination of the expected utility differences (see Cameron 
2003a). 
This modeling quickly becomes much more complicated if we assume that risk is 
endogenous, and we think that while challenging, this is more interesting. For example, strictly 
speaking we might say that in the long run the household can move further away from the 
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hazardous waste, reducing the risks from exposure. Or, in the case of nuclear waste shipping, 
households might move a safe distance away from the proposed routes. In that case, risk is not a 
simple exogenously determined probability there are two options for estimation. 
One "option" for dealing with risk endogeneity is to make a simplifying assumption, as 
suggested by Graham (1981) in his special case for individual-risk. There Graham (1981) suggests 
that we simply redefme the states so that they are similar for all individuals. An example would be 
so that "state 1" is exposure and "state 2" is no-exposure. We don't fmd this to be particularly 
appealing for empirical work, but postpone discussion of option two until Case C is considered 
below. 
[Case B] Another possibility one might face is that the density function used to implement 
uncertainty is again known and exogenous, but more complex than the above simple Bernoulli 
example, perhaps requiring evaluation of an integral (e.g. in the absence of a closed form). An 
assumption maintained is that the random process relating to Eq is independent of that process 
underlying the usual error term. In this case there is an additional level of complexity making the 
usual recovery of welfare terms more difficult. Simulation methods are required in this case to 
estimate the ex ante welfare measure (e.g. Cameron 2003a), but simulation methods appear to be 
quite popular at this point (e.g. they are used in the mixed, random parameters, or heterogeneous 
logit models), so this alone is not likely to thwart efforts to recover welfare measures under 
uncertainty. Perhaps more interesting to the theorist would be careful consideration of how complex 
density functions relate to the Graham framework, where the contingent payments are simple 
functions of the probabilities. This is a key area where more work needs to be done. 
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[Case C: Individual-specific risks] Here we consider the case where the probability density function 
for q is clearly individual-specific (there is a subjective risk assessment), or perhaps endogenous to 
the individual. We believe that subjective risks and endogenous risks are slightly different, but these 
concepts relate to alternatives to the EUM. One could have a subjective assessment of risk that 
differs substantially from one made by an "expert," but not be able to control that risk level. 
Alternatively, through self-protection (mitigation) one might control exposure and hence, health 
risks, making them endogenous to the household. 
Suppose each individual has a process of forming perceptions of risk, so that n; varies for 
each individual, and likely depends on a host of factors. One might simply use a persons' stated 
probability in their EUM. This simple approach assumes that the stated probability is not a random 
variable, explained by factors in the household. Alternatively, a stated perceived risk can be 
assumed to be a random variable, estimated as a function of some explanatory variables, and used 
later, in choice modeling or valuation (see Agee and Crocker). In some recent efforts the modelers 
literally estimate each individual's perceived risk. In turn, this estimate feeds back into a model that 
determines choice. 
Viscusi and others have also gone further than simply using the stated probabilities in 
such a simple manner (Viscusi 1989, 1990). Prospect Theory research (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981) indicates that gains and losses are valued differently under uncertainty, even if the 
monetary equivalent is the same in each case. A Bayesian spirit is associated with the alternative 
approaches suggested by these authors because individuals are thought to process information, 
update their priors, and perhaps reveal subjective, but posterior probabilities associated with risk. 
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It has been suggested that with enough information and updating, the posterior should come 
quite close to the true objective or expert risk assessment or probability. This is simple to see in 
Viscusi's (1989) prospective reference theory (PRT), described above, which generalizes some 
earlier proposals by psychologists Smith (1992) shows that the expression for the option price in 
the PRT context can be viewed as the weighted average of two expected utility functions. One 
substitutes the I1(Prob) expression into the basic EUM equation (1). Typically regrouping terms 
leads to formulas that allow key features to be examined. Lattimore et al. (1992) generate similar 
functions , leading to a risk transformation function. Viscusi, Magat and Huber demonstrate that 
much of the above can be accomplished by generating reduced form equations for the risk 
perceptions, and in fact, much of Viscusi's empirical work does just this (e.g. Evans and 
Viscusi). However, we find no exact description of the ex ante welfare measure is in those 
studies, and often none is even estimated. 
[Case D Endogenous Risk] Consider endogenous risks. Suppose that the household can affect the 
level of risk they face through certain actions and that we can collect data on individual-specific 
probabilities, possibly through stated probabilities, or possibly through a function that determines a 
household's probability. At the least, it would certainly seem appropriate to test for endogeneity, as 
self-protection lnight involve fairly low levels of effort and cost. For example, households with 
children facing mortality risk from second-hand smoke might control that risk by having the parents 
smoke outdoors, or in a room away from the children, or by adopting ventilation systems that 
reduce the smoke. Any situation where the parents of the household can mitigate against health risks 
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for themselves or their children might fall into this category. How they control the risk of course 
depends on the infonnation they have regarding these risks (see Agee and Crocker, 1994). 
Here again it would seem appropriate to estimate the risk function fIrst, before using any 
probability level in an expected utility model. As in the subjective risk case, many factors might 
predict the risk level a household actually faces, and these factors can change, thereby changing the 
probability level itself. If there are no concerns about econometric effIciency, then the risk functions 
can be estimated in a fIrst stage, then fed back into a decision model. In principle, we see no 
difference between handling endogenous risk and subjective risks as random variables. Agee and 
Crocker implement this approach using data on child lead exposure, viewing the risk function as a 
posterior estimate, calculated as a weighted average of the average exogenous risk, and the mean of 
the parents' prior beliefs. Their perceived risk is: 
(11) R = R(Ac,L;y,i') 
where Ac are child care activities, L is chelation therapy, and the next two variables are family 
characteristics, and exogenous infonnation about risks of lead exposure given to the family. This is 
not at all unlike the PRT model of Viscusi's in theory, but Agee and Crocker do not actually 
estimate an equation such as (11) above. Rather, they simply estimate the demand for chelation 
therapy for the child, being only able to observe whether the child was chelated or not. They 
interpret their probit estimates as being the probability of obtaining chelation therapy, which they 
say indirectly reflects the parents assessment of the risks to their child. 
[Case E: Ambiguity] The last case we consider is a subset of Case C and involves individuals who 
are uncertain about the uncertainty, or who are "ambiguous." An ambiguity effect, (Amb), can be 
interpreted as the variance on the amount that the person is uncertain about the probability itself. If 
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the individual states the probability of this with some ambiguity (see Ellsberg 1961; Einhorn and 
Hogarth; Viscusi and Chesson), then the randomness owed to the ambiguity might indeed relate to 
the randomness underlying the behaviors. The more uncertain the respondent is about the risks of 
the accident, the less utility she receives, which is consistent with Ellsberg's ambiguity aversion. 
This additional influence of ambiguity is novel in empirical models. It can be introduced by 
decomposing the event risk variable into two distinct random variables, one pertaining to the event 
and another to the ambiguity (see Riddel and Shaw 2004). Cameron (2003b) also allows for 
something like ambiguity in a more simple manner, and allowing for this effect appears to be 
important, so much more work lies ahead. 
6. Conclusion 
Environmental economists would understand much less than they do now if Graham had not 
laid out the relationship between possible welfare measures under uncertainty. He set our profession 
straight on the possible relationships between the ES, OV, and OP, explaining why the OP would be 
preferred in most situations. It is a bit difficult, but quite possible today for applied economists to 
collect data and estimate actual option price measures of welfare: Cameron's and Riddel and her 
coauthors' recent papers are good examples. Studies that incorporate uncertainty or risk and obtain 
values for environmental changes do so primarily using SP data. Weare not disparaging of stated 
preference models, but many other economists are, so development of RP-data models likely needs 
more attention. Environmental economists need to catch up with economists who use RP data to 
value health risks related to automobile safety, risks to residents in houses in certain locations, etc. 
These studies incorporate behaviors that are costly to the individual, easily observed, and which 
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provide a clue to preferences for risk by observing the trade off between money and risk reductions. 
On the theoretical side, Smith (1992) hints we cannot view ex ante welfare measures from 
alternative models to the EUM in exactly the same manner as we would Graham's OP, but this 
issue has not yet been fully examined. Clearly, if one keeps the locus of payments for uncertain 
outcomes in mind, as in Figure 1, then introducing utility functions that themselves depend on 
nonlinear functions of the probabilities, or that in some way make the sign of the second derivative 
of the WTP locus ambiguous, may create a different ex ante welfare concept than what Graham 
depicts using the WTP locus. We do not believe that this means that alternative models lack 
usefulness in terms of welfare measurement, but it may be the case, in some situations, that resulting 
welfare measures will require careful scrutiny. 
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ayment if sick (P 5) 
OV = OP - E[S] 
Fair bet 
ES OP payment ifH 
Figure 1. Graham's expected utility locus for any pair of payments, P2 and Pl. Downward sloped 
straight line shows the odds ratio, or slope equal to - [Prob/l-prob]. Tangency with the WTP locus 
gives the "fairbet" point, and S is a pair of traditional surplus points. Parallel downward sloping line 
through S shows ES, at intersection with 45 degree line. The OP is where the payments are equal on 
the locus, at intersection point with 45 degree line. 
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Valuing Environmental Changes in the Presence of Risk: An Update and 
Discussion of Some Empirical Issues 
Abstract 
The theory of ex -ante welfare measures is well established and has been addressed extensively in 
papers relating to the valuation of environmental resources when environmental variables have a 
random component. However, there have been many new developments in incorporating risks and 
uncertainty into economic models, and perhaps more importantly, there seems to be remaining 
confusion as to how to empirically implement such models. To date, a variety of estimation 
techniques have been utilized, with varying degrees of success in deriving an ex -ante welfare 
measure under risk. This manuscript assesses the state of the art by discussing the sources of risk, 
uncertainty, and error in utility models that incorporate risk. We are most interested in how to 
incorporate these ideas into empirical models and we examine how econometric estimation methods 
can best be used to obtain ex-ante welfare measures. We also present the current thinking on 
endogenous versus exogenous risks as well as subjective versus "expert" risk measures, and discuss 
some of the advantages and disadvantages likely to be encountered when using subjective-based 
risk estimates in empirical applications based on alternatives to the expected utility models. 
Valuing Environmental Changes in the Presence of Risk: An Update and 
Discussion of Some Empirical Issues! 
1. Introduction 
In this manuscript we examine the current literature on valuing environmental changes that 
involve risk or uncertainty. We are most interested in how econometric estimation methods can be 
used in models to obtain ex-ante welfare measures under conditions of risk, but understanding the 
underlying micro economic theory is naturally essential to pursue empirical modeling so that is also 
addressed. Examples below relate to changes in the environment that can affect human and 
ecological health and well-being. 
Much of the risk-oriented economics literature is concerned with fmancial risk, where future 
income is uncertain and the focus is on trade offs between expected income and risk of investments. 
"Risk" typically measured by the variance of an asset portfolio (e.g. Hirschleifer; Pratt). While a 
great debt is owed to the authors of this literature, the work is perhaps only somewhat helpful in 
understanding how to model responses to environmental changes under risk. Another strand of 
economics literature focuses on human health and the risk of illness and death, but much of this 
literature is absent empirical values for risk changes and sometimes lacks a connection to the 
environment. It is nevertheless important, as it focuses on the theory relating to the value of a 
statistical life (VSL), and VSLs are regularly used in making environmental policy decisions (e.g. 
Berger et al.). Still another important strand of risk literature focuses on psychological models and 
risk perceptions (e.g. Slovic). Finally, there are several risk-oriented papers in the environmental 
1 This is naturally a highly selective review of the recent literature and we apologize to all those who have 
contributed important work in the area of modeling risk-taking behavior, especially as it relates to environmental 
changes. Our focus here is on papers that relate to empirical issues, but the reader interested in theory can see 
Schoemaker or Starmer' s survey papers. 
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